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Swords into Plowshares: A Pilgrimage for the
CSS Alabama
William W. Park*
They shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks.
Nation shall not raise sword against nation, nor will they study war anymore.1
A B S T R A C T
During the American Civil War, Britain sold ships to the Southern Confederacy in
breach of neutrality obligations, triggering a dispute with the United States carrying
threats of armed conflict. Some American politicians saw the dispute as an opportunity
to annex Canada, then a weak assemblage of British colonies. Ultimately, arbitration in
Geneva averted war, opening an era of long Anglo-American cooperation. The historical
consequence of this landmark 1872 arbitration remains difficult to overstate. In addition
to its diplomatic importance, the case introduced significant procedural precedents for
international arbitration, including dissenting options, reasoned awards, party-appointed
arbitrators, collegial deliberations, and arbitrators’ declarations on their own jurisdiction.
The saga of the CSS Alabama, the vessel from which the arbitration took its name,
provides a narrative as griping in detail as the arbitral proceedings prove meaningful in
legal legacy.
1 . A R B I T R A T I O N A N D I N T E R N A T I O N A L L A W
In September 1872, an arbitral tribunal in Geneva directed Great Britain to pay the
United States US$15.5 million in gold, an amount near US$330 million in today’s
money.2 The arbitral award fixed damages for Britain’s role in building, fitting, and
servicing ships to help the secessionist Southern Confederacy during the American
* William W. Park, Professor of Law, Boston University. Honorary Fellow, Selwyn College, Cambridge.
Adapted from The Berthold Goldman Lecture, Paris Arbitration Academy, 10 July 2018.
Copyright VC William W Park 2021.
1 Isaiah 2:4. Biblical references to ‘swords into plowshares’ also receive mention by other Hebrew prophets:
Micah 4:3 and Joel 3:10. In farming, the ‘share’ of a plow comprises a cutting edge to break soil for plant-
ing. The prophets evoke an image of destructive instruments, swords, transformed into tools for productive
work, the plowshares.
2 Alabama Claims, United States v Great Britain, 29 RIAA (Reports of International Arbitral Awards/Recueil
des Sentences Arbitrales) 125–34 (Nations Unies-United Nations), Award of 14 September 1872 rendered
by tribunal established under art 1, Treaty of Washington, 8 May 1871, accessible with related documents
on website of Historian of the US Department of State: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1872p2v4/d34> accessed 30 June 2021.
VC The Author(s) 2021. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the London Court of International Arbitration.
For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com
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Civil War, creating a naval force that inflicted significant harm on the Northern
Union merchant fleet.3
That Civil War split the United States in a bloody fratricidal conflict lasting from
1861 through 1865. During much of that time, the sailing vessel Alabama circled the
globe under command of its charismatic captain, Raphael Semmes, commissioned by
the South to attack Northern shipping. The great wheel of the Alabama bore an am-
bitious motto engraved in bronze: Aide-toi et le ciel t’aidera, equivalent to ‘God helps
those who help themselves’.
Following the Civil War, the United States sought reparations for damages caused
by the CSS Alabama and other vessels supplied by Britain to the South during that
conflict. By the 1871 Treaty of Washington, the two countries agreed to arbitrate
their differences in Geneva, averting military action and setting paradigms for inter-
national dispute resolution.4
In the British peace movement of that day, many saw the Geneva proceed-
ings as a model for ending war through arbitration.5 British acceptance of arbi-
tration also owed much to the unfortified borders of Canada, then a weak
assemblage of British colonies presenting easy pickings for invasion by the
United States.6
3 For ease of expression, the terms ‘Confederacy’ and ‘South’ refer to the eleven states that seceded during
the Civil War, with ‘Union’ and ‘North’ designating states not in rebellion. The term ‘United States’ applies
to the entire country before and after the War, or to the Union’s diplomatic presence in wartime. Thus, in
1863, one might refer to the ‘Union’ navy or the ‘Confederate’ navy, but to the ‘United States’ embassy in
London.
4 On the significance of the arbitration, one authority notes as follows: ‘Settling the Alabama Claims is an
obscure episode that has receded in history and sounds a trifle dated and musty, of interest only to profes-
sional historians. Yet its dramatic importance cannot be overstated, for it showed the value of international
arbitration, banished lingering ill will between the United States and Great Britain, and launched a new fra-
ternal relationship of major consequence.’ Ron Chernow, Grant (2017) 727.
5 See Paul Laity, The British Peace Movement 1870-1914 (2001). The British Peace Society adopted ‘Swords
into Plowshares’ (Isaiah 2:4) for the masthead of its journal Herald of Peace. Hopes of ‘peace through arbi-
tration’ overlapped 19th century Messianic movements with analogous aspirations. See Yaakov Ariel and
Ruth Kark, ‘Messianism, Holiness, Charisma and Community: The American-Swedish Colony in
Jerusalem’ 65 Church History 641–57 (1996), describing pilgrimages to Jerusalem from Chicago and from
Dalarna (Sweden) in 1881 and 1896, respectively, which triggered the 1902 novel Jerusalem by Selma
Lagerlöf, the first woman to receive a Nobel Prize for Literature. See also Tom Powers, Jerusalem’s
American Colony (2009).
6 Annexation of Canada had been pressed by the irascible Bostonian, Charles Sumner, who during much of
the treaty negotiations with Britain had served as Chair of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, al-
though ousted from that position in March 1871, prior to conclusion of the Treaty of Washington.
Sumner initially demanded not only annexation of Canada, but British withdrawal from the entire Western
Hemisphere including the Caribbean and the Falkland Islands. See Chernow (n 4) 722. Sumner’s bad tem-
per derived in part from a beating by South Carolina Congressman Preston Brooks, whose kinsman
Sumner had disparaged. See Stephen Puleo, The Caning: Assault that Drove America to Civil War (2012);
Arthur T Downey, Civil War Lawyers (2010). A vignette about the war threat appears in memoirs of a
woman whose plantations were burned by Union troops. Recounting ‘talk of war’ between England and
the United States because of the Alabama, she adds that ‘ex-Confederate soldiers would have gladly aided
[England] to whip the United States.’ Cecilia Lawton, Memoir of Plantation Life, War, and Reconstruction in
Georgia and South Carolina (Karen Stokes ed, Mercer U Press 2021) 74, review by C Michael Harrington,
‘A Southern Plantation Mistress’s Account of Sherman’s March and Reconstruction’ Civil War News
(2021).
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Johnny Veeder, to whom this essay pays tribute, described the Alabama
Arbitration as lying at ‘the origin of what international arbitration is today’.7 Beyond
cavil, few arbitrations impose more lasting traces than these proceedings arising from
depredations of British-built vessels.8 The arbitration’s starring role in the develop-
ment of international adjudication derives not only from the nature of the conflict
and the magnitude of the debates, but also from how the arbitrators addressed signif-
icant procedural and jurisdictional questions. Legacies of the case touch both the
substance of international law and the procedural evolution of international dispute
resolution.9 Attributes of modern arbitration derived from the Alabama Arbitration
include reasoned awards, party-appointed arbitrators, dissenting opinions, collegial
deliberations, and arbitral declarations on their own jurisdiction, to which we shall
turn after a short introduction to the facts giving rise to the proceedings.
2 . T H E C O N F E D E R A T E N A V Y
The narrative of the CSS Alabama starts with agents of the Southern Confederacy
travelling to London early in 1861, just after the start of the American Civil War.
The secessionist states dispatched representatives seeking ships to prey on Union
merchant vessels, with the aim of crippling Northern commerce. The Confederacy
obtained two dozen gunboats, cruisers, and transports. Three vessels later gained
fame as the Alabama, the Florida, and the Shenandoah, each designated ‘CSS’ to indi-
cate Confederate States Ship.
2.1 The Alabama
The CSS Alabama had the privilege of giving her name to the arbitration in Geneva.
Built as Hull 290 by the Laird shipbuilders at Birkenhead near Liverpool, the ship
7 VV Veeder, ‘The Historical Keystone to International Arbitration: The Party-Appointed Arbitrator’ in
David Caron and others (eds), Practising Virtue: Inside International Arbitration (Festschrift for Charles
Brower 2015) 127, 147, adapted from (2013) 107 Proc Am Soc Int’l Law 387. In any set of essays to
Veeder’s honor, comment on the Alabama Arbitration commends itself by virtue of Johnny’s links both to
Britain and to the United States , as well as his love of the sea. Veeder’s ties to Britain include a Cambridge
education and practice as a London-based barrister. No less significant, Johnny’s ties to the United States
include an American wife named Marie, and a sailboat named Hurricane, moored in the coastal New
England village where his wife was raised.
8 In his magisterial treatise on international law, Professor John Bassett Moore of Columbia University wrote
that the Alabama Arbitration ‘was justly regarded as the greatest [arbitration] the world had ever seen’. JB
Moore, History and Digest of the International Arbitration to Which the U.S. has been a Party (vol 1 1898)
652–53. Of course, the ‘greatest ever seen’ label affixed itself more easily at a moment when the world had
observed fewer arbitrations than today.
9 See Tom Bingham, ‘The Alabama Arbitration’ (2005) 54 Int’l & Comp LQ 1; Charles Brower II, ‘Alabama
Arbitration’ in R Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia Public International Law (2012); Bruno de
Fumichon and William W Park, ‘Retour sur L’Affaire de L’Alabama’ (2019) 2019 Rev de l’Arbitrage 743;
A Ouedraogo, ‘La Neutralité Et L’émergence du Concept de due Diligence en Droit International -
L’affaire de l’Alabama revisitée’ (2011) 13 J Hist Int’l L/J D’Hist Droit Int’l 307; Jan Paulsson, ‘The
Alabama Arbitration: Statecraft and Stagecraft’ in U Franke, A Magnusson and J Dahlquist (eds),
Arbitrating for Peace: How Arbitration Made a Difference 7 (2016); A de La Pradelle and N Politis, Recueil
Des Arbitrages Internationaux, vol II (1923) 902. For a note focusing on the legacy of the 1872 proceedings,
see Bruno de Fumichon, ‘The Alabama Arbitration: From Compromise to Legacy’ in Neil Kaplan and
Robert Morgan (eds), Lawyer, Scholar, Teacher and Activist, A Liber Amicorum in honour of Derek Roebuck
(2021) 229.
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initially took the name Enrica in order to give credence to the ruse that she was
meant for the Italian government, not the Confederacy. The ruse did not go unno-
ticed by the American Ambassador to London, Charles Francis Adams, who urged
Britain to detain the vessel.
Relying on false information from the shipbuilders, British Foreign Secretary
Lord John Russell said he could not act without evidence of subterfuge. In re-
sponse, the United States consul at Liverpool gathered copies of letters by
Confederate agents and affidavits from British sailors already recruited, demon-
strating that the ship was built for hostilities. Ambassador Adams forwarded the
documents to Lord Russell.
In the interim, Confederate agents, alerted to possible detention of the vessel,
worked to accelerate her departure. The ship put to sea under pretence of a trial run,
celebrated with music and lady guests, permitting escape before orders from London
to stop the departure. The vessel sailed to Terceira in the Portuguese Azores, to be
armed and outfitted. On 24 August 1862, she was commissioned CSS Alabama with
two dozen officers and over a hundred enlisted men, most British nationals, all under
command of Captain Semmes.10 Subsequently, the CSS Alabama went around the
world, preying on Union commercial shipping in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, as
well as the South China Sea. The vessel approached victims under a British flag,
boarded the ships by surprise, seized cargo, and later freed the crew in a neutral port.
In two years, the CSS Alabama took sixty Union transports and whalers, and sank
the USS Hatteras off Galveston, Texas, while that Union gunboat attempted to
blockade Southern ports.
The CSS Alabama met her end on 19 June 1864, sunk by a Union gunboat, the
USS Kearsarge, off the Normandy coast near Cherbourg, France, where the
Confederate vessel had come for repairs. Crew of the CSS Alabama were rescued by
British yachts and welcomed with enthusiasm in England, following which they were
released to fight again.
The press in London and Paris had given advance announcement of the battle,
which took the character of a medieval joust, watched by onlookers arriving from
Britain on private yachts, one of which rescued Semmes. Trains from Paris
brought French spectators, among them the Impressionist painter Édouard Manet
whose tableau of the naval engagement took the title Le Combat du Kearsarge et de
l’Alabama.11
The CSS Alabama maintains a special cultural legacy in South Africa. When the
Confederate raider docked for supplies in Cape Town, then a British colony, the
10 A graduate of the US Naval Academy at Annapolis, Raphael Semmes worked after the Civil War at a mul-
titude of jobs, including professor of philosophy and literature at Louisiana State University. He edited a
newspaper and practiced law in Mobile, Alabama. His Memoirs of Service Afloat, During the War Between
the States was published in 1869 and republished by Alacrity Press in 2012. On the life of Semmes, see
Warren F Spencer, Raphael Semmes: The Philosophical Mariner (1997). See also the account by one of his
officers, in Arthur Sinclair, Two Years on the Alabama (1896).
11 The Manet now hangs in the Philadelphia Museum of Art. Other depictions of the battle include Sinking
of the CSS Alabama, painted later by American artist Xanthus Russell Smith, now in the Franklin D
Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, New York.
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ship made such an impression on the populace as to give rise to an Afrikaans folk-
song Daar Kom Die Alibama, still sung today with dancing at holidays.12
2.2 The Florida
Initially presented by her builders as the Oreto, ordered for a British subject as agent
of a Palermo firm purporting to represent the Italian government, the vessel’s true
nature as a warship had been difficult to disguise, given lack of storage for transport
of commercial goods, and an outfitting to receive six large guns. She left Liverpool in
early 1862 with a British crew, destined for Nassau, Bahamas, a British colony rela-
tively close to ports of the Confederacy. In Nassau she received arms, additional
crew, and her captain.
Prior to her arrival in Nassau, the United States consul in the Bahamas requested
the ship’s seizure on arrival, in accordance with Britain’s declaration of neutrality.
The British governor in Nassau directed inspection of the Oreto by an officer of the
Royal Navy, who found her unsuitable to mercantile shipping due to lack of storage.
The officer also noticed guns, ammunition, and a large Confederate flag.
Notwithstanding the report of the Royal Navy, a Nassau admiralty judge found
no violation of the neutrality declaration, suggesting as pure speculation a report of
the ship’s aim to join the Confederate navy. Following fraud in her departure from
Liverpool, and complicity by the judicial authorities in Nassau, the ship left under
British colours in August 1862, travelling through the Union blockade of Southern
ports to receive a commission in the Confederate Navy with the name CSS Florida.
After running the Union blockade to reach Nassau again, the CSS Florida pro-
ceeded to prey on Union merchant shipping, taking two dozen Northern ships with
a value estimated at more than US$6 million at the time. In October 1864, she was
finally captured in Brazilian waters by the Union warship, the USS Wachusett, built in
Boston and named for a small mountain in central Massachusetts.
2.3 The Shenandoah
The last of the three major ships to figure in the Geneva arbitration, CSS
Shenandoah, was built in Scotland as the Sea King, allegedly for transport in the
China trade. Initially registered to a British subject fronting for the Confederacy, the
ship left for Madeira, a Portuguese island in the Atlantic, where she received arma-
ment, crew, and captain. Renamed CSS Shenandoah, the vessel took a new flag and
commission. The vessel docked in Melbourne, then a British colony, to recruit crew
in violation of Britain’s neutrality. In response to inspection attempts by port authori-
ties, the captain pledged his ‘word of honor as a gentleman’ that no recruitment took
place. Britain accepted the representation, an act that proved ‘too polite’ according
to Count Sclopis, president of the Alabama Arbitration tribunal.
The Shenandoah remains unique among the ships implicated by the Geneva arbi-
tration, in that she roamed the Pacific for months after the surrender of the main
Confederate army by General Robert E Lee at Appomattox. Without telephone or
12 In Afrikaans, the song runs: ‘Daar kom die Alibama, Die Alibama kom oor die see. Daar kom die
Alibama, Die Alibama kom oor die see.’ In English: ‘There comes the Alabama, the Alabama comes over
the sea. There comes the Alabama, the Alabama comes over the sea.’
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email, the ship’s captain believed that Confederate President Jefferson Davis contin-
ued the war independently of Lee’s army.13
This iron-framed teak ship operated in North Pacific whaling grounds, before
heading towards the Arctic Ocean, capturing dozens of Yankee whalers. Only in
August 1865, after the Civil War ended, did the ship’s captain learn that all
Confederate armies had surrendered. The Shenandoah then sailed via Cape Horn to
Britain, entering the River Mersey in November 1865, where all her officers and
crew were released on parole.
3 . N O T I O N S O F N E U T R A L I T Y
3.1 British ambivalence
Early in the 19th century Britain ended the slave trade and abolished its colonial slav-
ery. Nevertheless, many in Britain remained sympathetic to the Confederacy, given
that Lancashire mills depending on Southern cotton to make textiles.
Against that backdrop, Britain on 13 May 1861 issued a proclamation of neutrality
in the American Civil War.14 At that time, the relevant law of naval neutrality derived
largely from the British Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819, prohibiting recruitment of
British subjects for service in a foreign navy. Nonetheless, British seamen enlisted in
the Confederate navy after being recruited by employment companies operating for
the South. British shipyards remained ready to help the South build and service its
fleet.
Rightly or wrongly, English courts sometimes interpreted the Foreign Enlistment
Act in a way that assisted the South. A ship initially named the Alexandra had been
launched in 1863 after being built in Liverpool. The American ambassador in
London gave Lord Russell, British Foreign Secretary, evidence of the ship’s military
purpose and Southern destination.15 In subsequent legal proceedings, a court found
the law prohibited only fitting and arming of ships, not their construction. Since the
Alexandra had not yet been fitted or armed, she was released. After a change of
name to the Mary, the ship (now fitted and armed) set sail as a privateer for the
Confederates, capturing Union shipping while visiting British ports such as Halifax
and Bermuda, until seized in December 1864 at Nassau.
3.2 Benevolent neutrality
In hindsight, neutrality often bears a chameleonlike character, changing colour,
morally and legally, depending on the background of neutrality violations.
Turning a blind eye to construction of ships for the Confederacy, Britain mani-
fested a neutrality ‘benevolent’ towards the South that later presented itself in a
13 See Amanda Foreman, A World on Fire: British Involvement in the American Civil War (2010) 719,
recounting details of the Shenandoah’s surrender.
14 Derived from a proclamation issued 13 May 1861, the British neutrality commitment appears uncon-
tested, as confirmed by the 1872 award itself issued in the Alabama Arbitration.
15 See generally Frank J Merli, The Alabama, British Neutrality, and the American Civil War (David M Fahey
ed, 2004), edited by Professor David M Fahey after an illness shortened completion by Professor Merli.
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most unfavourable light, given the North’s victory in a Civil War fought largely
over slavery.16
In contrast, consider the ‘benevolent neutrality’ in a vignette about an officer in
the US Navy during the Second World War, assigned to gunnery duty on the mer-
chant ship Julia Ward Howe in convoy across the Atlantic Ocean. In late January
1943, blown off course by heavy weather, the isolated ship was torpedoed by a
German submarine. Floating in rafts, survivors were rescued by a Portuguese vessel
and taken to Ponta Delgada in the Azores, then Portuguese territory, northwest of
Terceira where eighty years earlier a British-built ship had been transformed into the
CSS Alabama.
Officially Portugal remained neutral during the Second World War. Thus, the
officer should have been kept in the Azores for the war’s duration, preventing re-
turn to combat on behalf of the American Navy. The benevolent attitude of
Portugal towards the Anglo-American wartime alliance led to a different out-
come, however.17
During his time in the Azores, for which he retained a life-long affection, the res-
cued American officer read and re-read the one English-language book he could find:
Beware of Pity, a translation of the novel by Austrian writer Stefan Zweig. That novel
narrated a relationship between a Hapsburg cavalry soldier and the paralyzed daugh-
ter of a Hungarian landowner on the eve of the First World War.18
That Austrian novel led the author of this present essay to a fuller appreciation for
shades of naval neutrality. During an American Thanksgiving dinner in New England,
years after the shipwrecked officer’s internment in the Azores, my father noticed his elder
son reading Beware of Pity and remarked: ‘Years ago I read that book four times. The
only book in English on Delgada.’ Our family then listened to the tale of benevolent neu-
trality in relation to the torpedoed ship and the officer’s escape from the Azores.
As the officer read and re-read the book by Zweig, the Portuguese grew weary of
feeding the American. Reciprocal internment fatigue led to an exit plan, with the lo-
cal mayor turning his back while the officer boarded a steamer for London, rejoining
the American Navy for the rest of the war: precisely what neutrality obligations
aimed to prevent.
The incident illustrates how context affects the moral tone and the legal conse-
quences of a neutral country’s aid to belligerents. In one instance a Portuguese
mayor permitted an American naval officer to rejoin his command to struggle against
16 On the law of neutrality, see generally Robert W Tucker, The Law of War and Neutrality at Sea (1955)
165–95, reprinted in International Law Studies series published by the Naval War College of Newport,
Rhode Island.
17 The alliance between Portugal and England goes back to the 1386 Treaty of Windsor, sealed by the mar-
riage of King John of Portugal and Philippa of Lancaster, a treaty which in turn affirmed an earlier pledge
of perpetual friendship between the two seafaring nations.
18 After publication in 1939, Zweig’s Ungeduld des Herzens (‘Impatience of the Heart’) received transla-
tion into English as Beware of Pity and into French as La Pitié Dangeureuse. The remarkable work of
Stefan Zweig did not limit itself to fiction, but included significant historical essays, including com-
ment on religious freedom through narrative of the life of Spanish physician Michael Servetus, in
Castellio gegen Calvin oder Ein Gewissen gegen die Gewalt (1936), taking a 16th century Geneva heresy
trial as the springboard for reflection on the Nazi menace present in Europe at the date Zweig was
writing.
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Nazis. In another case, Britain helped a rebellious Confederacy in a war linked to
maintaining slavery.
4 . T H E A R B I T R A T I O N
4.1 The Treaty of Washington
On 8 May 1871, Britain and the United States concluded the Treaty of
Washington,19 instituting tribunals and commissions to settle several disputes arising
from the American Civil War, chief of which were the so-called Alabama Claims. The
proceeding avoided war between Britain and the United States, and established pro-
cedural precedents to guide international arbitrations.20 The Treaty combined an
agreement to arbitrate with provisions for the law to be applied by the arbitrators.
Building on principles elaborated over the prior half century, Article VI of the Treaty
set forth three so-called ‘Rules’ to cover British actions in respect of the Southern
Confederacy during the American Civil War.21
The First Rule provided that a neutral government must use ‘due diligence’ to
prevent the fitting, arming, or equipping, within its jurisdiction, of any vessel which
it had reasonable ground to believe was intended for war, and to prevent departure
from neutral territory of vessels specially adapted for war. The ‘due diligence’ re-
quirement covered situations that had remained ambiguous in prior law, but did
not per se preclude construction of vessels. The Second Rule forbade a neutral from
allowing a belligerent to use its ports as a base of naval operations, or for renewal
or augmentation of military supplies or recruitment of crew. The Third Rule
19 A contemporaneous account of negotiation of the Treaty appears in Caleb Cushing, Treaty of Washington
(1873) (appending the texts of the 8 May 1871 Treaty and the 14 September 1872 award).
Congressman from Massachusetts, Cushing served at the Geneva arbitration as counsel to the United
States, appointed by President Grant. Four decades later, Cushing’s secretary wrote his own account. See
Frank Warren Hackett, Reminiscences of the Geneva Tribunal of Arbitration (1911), Introduction at ix (ob-
serving that ‘time cannot lessen the interest with which the statesman must look back upon it.’).
20 The notion of ‘precedents’ remains problematic for arbitration. In national legal systems precedent often
provides a measure of certainty permitting people to regulate their affairs. In international law, precedent
plays a softer role, with past decisions guiding future conduct in a less binding fashion. The extent to
which arbitrators must follow precedent has been explored by Pierre Mayer, ‘Reflections on the
International Arbitrator’s Duty to Apply the Law’ (2001) 17 Arb Int’l 235. See also, W Michael Reisman,
‘Case Specific Mandates v Systemic Implications: How Should Investment Tribunals Decide?’ (2013) 29
Arb Int’l 131; William W Park, ‘Arbitration’s Protean Nature: The Value of Rules and the Risks of
Discretion’ (2003) 19 Arb Int’l 279. See also Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, ‘Arbitral Precedent: Dream,
Necessity or Excuse?’ (2007) 23 Arb Int’l 357, 358, and 374, distinguishing legal and moral duties for
arbitrators to follow prior cases.
21 In passing, one notes that determination of applicable law for state actors has long been problematic. See
award in Aramco Arbitration of 23 August 1958, (1963) 27 Int’l Law Rep 117, discussed in Stephen M
Schwebel, ‘Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Aramco Arbitrate the Onassis Agreement’ (2010) 3 J World
Energy Law & Bus 245. A 1933 concession between Saudi Arabia and a subsidiary of Standard Oil of
California, later Aramco, triggered disputes when King Abdul Aziz, son of the Kingdom’s founder,
awarded transport contracts to Greek shipping magnate Aristotle Onassis. When Aramco contested the
contracts, a 1955 agreement between Aramco and Saudi Arabia referred the dispute to arbitration pursu-
ant to Islamic law ‘as interpreted by the Hanbali school’. One expert said the Hanbali school did not per-
mit private appropriation of liquid underground minerals, preventing Aramco from receiving exclusive
rights. Another expert endorsed a view that Muslim leaders could grant control of minerals. The Geneva
arbitral tribunal found the Hanbali school ‘embryonic’ on the question, ruling the Onassis agreement in-
compatible with the Concession.
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required a neutral to exercise due diligence in its own ports or waters, and with re-
spect to all persons within its jurisdiction, in order to prevent violation of the obli-
gations and duties set forth in the two earlier rules. This ‘catch-all’ obligation
aimed at the type of behaviour in which British ports had provided assistance
favourable to Confederate cruisers.
Britain did not assent to the three Rules as representing international law during
the period of the American Civil War. Rather, Britain accepted that the arbitrators
would apply those principles to the then–current disputes, describing articulation of
the Rules as a British concession to friendly relations with the United States. The
Treaty committed Britain and the United States to observe these Rules in the
future.22
Britain’s partial acceptance of the Rules may owe something to concerns about
Europe’s balance of power. In 1870 Prussia defeated France in war, founding a
Reich ambitious for naval as well as land supremacy. In any conflict with the
emerging German empire, Britain would have sought from the United States a neu-
trality more genuine than that demonstrated by Britain towards the Southern
Confederacy.
The arbitral process contemplated by the Treaty of Washington built on ‘mixed
commissions’ used for earlier dispute settlement,23 with the Alabama Claims to be
decided by five arbitrators in Geneva, two appointed by the disputing parties, Britain
and the United States, and the remaining three appointed by Brazil, Italy, and
Switzerland. These arbitrators would decide by a majority.
The arbitral tribunal included a cavalcade of stars. Queen Victoria appointed Sir
Alexander Cockburn, Britain’s Lord Chief Justice, clever and learned, but arrogant
even by criteria of his day.24 Cockburn was known for his brilliant mind and his dubi-
ous reputation, having seduced one of Queen Victoria’s ladies in waiting. American
President Ulysses Grant appointed Charles Francis Adams, a distinguished
Bostonian, son and grandson of two American presidents. Like his father and grand-
father, Adams had served as American ambassador to London.
The King of Italy, Vittorio Emanuele II, named Count Federico Sclopis, a jurist
from the Piedmont and later president of the Italian Senate. Brazilian Emperor
Pedro II named Marcos Antonio d’Araujo, Baron d’Itajuba, Brazil’s ambassador to
Paris and Professor of Law at the University of Olinda. Switzerland chose Jakob
22 Treaty art VI, following declaration of the Rules, includes a statement that Her Britannic Majesty did not
assent to the Rules as law in force at the time when the claims arose, but agreed that in deciding questions
between the two countries arising out of Civil War claims, ‘the Arbitrators should assume that her
Majesty’s Government had undertaken to act upon the principles set forth in these rules.’ Britain and the
United States also agreed to observe these rules as between themselves in future, and to bring them to
the knowledge of other Maritime Powers.
23 A notable example lay in the 1794 Jay Treaty, named for John Jay, the New York jurist who served as first
Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court. Traveling to London to resolve questions left open by the
American Revolution, Jay helped establish procedures to address the border with Canada, American debts
to British businesses, and compensation for British seizure of American ships. Mixed commissions in-
cluded representatives from each side in equal number, with a chair (president) either agreed by the par-
ties or drawn by lot, but without a casting vote. Decisions were to be unanimous.
24 Under today’s standards for arbitrator impartiality, Cockburn would likely be rejected as arbitrator, having
advised Lord Palmerston that the Alabama could leave Birkenhead.
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Stämpfli, a jurist from Berne whose strong mind and personality permitted him to
play key roles in brokering pivotal compromises.25
Claims by American citizens would be presented by the United States govern-
ment, with damages paid by Britain then distributed among the private claimants.
The Treaty provided for the arbitral tribunal to determine British liability with re-
spect to Union vessels destroyed or captured by Confederate ships built or serviced
in Britain in violation of neutrality obligations set forth in the aforementioned three
Rules of the Treaty. The tribunal was to decide whether Britain, by act or omission,
failed to fulfil its duties of neutrality. Liability would be fixed for each of the
Confederate vessels that received assistance in violation of principles of neutrality.
The arbitrators would determine the sum of damages, albeit with the caveat that
questions of quantum could be sent to a board of assessors.
4.2 The Geneva Proceedings
The arbitration took place in Geneva’s Old City Hall in a room now known as La Salle
Alabama,26 with more than twenty sessions during the three months following final writ-
ten submissions in June, until issuance of the award in September. The case initially pro-
ceeded swiftly, with arbitrators meeting to organize their tribunal on 15 December 1871.
The parties delivered their memorials and evidence in a timely fashion.27 Counter-
memorials were delivered on 15 April 1872. Then things began to go awry. For its clos-
ing argument, the United States met the deadline of 15 June 1872, while Britain did not.
The British submitted a note expressing regret that the governments were unable
to agree on the arbitrators’ jurisdiction. The United States had claimed compensa-
tion not only for the destruction of Northern ships and cargoes, but also for harm
from alleged prolongation of the war after the Battle of Gettysburg in July 1863.
Such indirect damages from extended warfare included lower exports, increased costs
of marine insurance, and transfer of commercial shipping to non-American vessels,
25 Stämpfli had sat as Councilor in the Bundesrat (Conseil Fédéral), the cabinet of ministers for the Swiss
Confederation, which transfers a presiding gavel among its members in rotation. At various times, he had
headed the Swiss Ministries of Justice, of Finance, and of Military, as well as serving three terms as Chair
of the Council itself.
26 The room memorializes this milestone in peaceful dispute resolution with a metal plowshare evoking the
Biblical prophecy of Isaiah 2:4, to the effect that in Messianic times nations shall beat ‘swords into plow-
shares’. La Charrue de la Paix (‘Plowshare of Peace’), made from swords of American army officers, first
appeared at the 1876 Philadelphia Centennial Exposition. After exhibition in Paris at the 1878 Exposition
Universelle, the Universal Peace Union gifted the Plowshare to the people of Geneva. In 1864 the same
room served to create the Comité International de la Croix-Rouge (CICR), responsible for humanitarian
protection of war victims. See Hôtel de Ville de Genève, Chancellerie de l’Etat de Genève, Imprimerie
Studer SA, Genève (Décembre 1968), updated by Barbara Roth-Lochner and Livio Fornara (1986). On
the Swiss role in international dispute resolution, see Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler and Antonio Rigozzi,
International Arbitration: Law and Practice in Switzerland 33–36, ss1.105–1.107 (2015).
27 The Treaty established a filing sequence in its arts IV, V, and VII, with the two sides to begin with simul-
taneous exchange of memorials and evidence, which simultaneity might be considered disadvantageous to
Britain, forced to speculate on details of the claims, even before seeing the formal American submission.
Then there was to be simultaneous counter-memorials four months later, with written summaries of evi-
dence and argument delivered in another two months. The Treaty gave the tribunal authority to require
further written statements, with replies, as well as oral argument.
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all estimated at US$2 billion, in value today an amount more than twenty times
larger, near US$42 billion.
Ultimately, on 19 June 1872, the tribunal issued a declaration that indirect claims
did not constitute a foundation for compensation or damages in this particular case,
and thus would be excluded from the consideration in making its award. In practice,
the declaration on indirect claims constituted a jurisdictional ruling, with the tribunal
limiting its authority to fixing direct damages only. Britain then filed final written
submissions, and the tribunal proceeded to make decisions for each vessel.
4.3 The award
On 14 September 1872, the arbitral tribunal announced its decision, awarding
US$15.5 million in gold as an indemnity to be paid by Britain for breach of neutrality
in respect of Southern vessels, principally the Florida, the Alabama, and the
Shenandoah. The award added an interpretative wrinkle to a neutral nation’s obliga-
tion to exercise due diligence to prevent fitting, arming, or equipping of vessels
intended for war. According to the arbitrators, diligence must be exercised ‘in exact
proportion’ to risks posed by failure to meet neutrality obligations.28 Costs of action
and inaction would be weighed against each other, with greater risk to the Union re-
quiring greater diligence by Britain in respect to ships constructed in her territory.
With respect to the CSS Alabama, all arbitrators considered Britain in default re-
garding its duties as a neutral. Sir Alexander Cockburn, however, refused to sign the
award and issued a lengthy separate opinion, elaborating further on notions of pro-
portionality in the duty of diligence. The arbitral tribunal found unanimously that
British authorities ignored warnings of American diplomats, failing to take measures
to prevent construction in Birkenhead or departure for armament in the Azores.
Detention orders came too late to be executed. After its ‘escape’, the Alabama was
freely admitted into the ports of British colonies.
For the Florida and the Shenandoah, liability was found by a majority only.
Regarding the CSS Florida, four arbitrators, with Cockburn dissenting, judged
that Britain failed to fulfil neutrality obligations, not only in allowing the vessel to be
constructed in Liverpool, but also in allowing enlistment of crews and supplies when
she reached Nassau.
For the CSS Shenandoah a majority found liability, with Brazilian Baron d’Itajuba
joining Sir Alexander Cockburn in dissent. The award held Britain liable only for acts
during the vessel’s stop in Melbourne, then a British colony. Confederate agents had
skilfully concealed her departure from Scotland, thus obviating liability at the point
she left British waters. During the ship’s stay at Melbourne, however, the Shenandoah
enlisted more sailors. Britain thus failed in her duties as a neutral, permitting belliger-
ent use of her ports for naval operations.
After determining liability for British assistance in connection with the ships, the
tribunal tackled quantum of damages. By a majority (Cockburn, joined by the Italian
28 This proportionality test appeared in the award’s definition of ‘due diligence’ (as it appeared in art VI of
the Treaty of Washington), stating that a neutral must exercise the duty of due diligence ‘in exact propor-
tion to the risks to which either of the belligerents may be exposed from a failure to fulfil the obligations
of neutrality on their part’. Alabama Claims Case (US v Gr Brit) 19 RIAA 125, 129 (1872).
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Sclopis and the Brazilian d’Itajuba), the tribunal rejected so-called ‘costs of pursuit’
representing expenses of the Union Navy hunting for Southern ships, deemed indis-
tinguishable from general war expenses. In detail, the award addressed claims not
only for the three principal ships, but also for tenders and other auxiliary vessels,
with exotic names like Tuscaloosa, Nashville, Tallahassee, Jefferson Davis, and even
Boston, the last a surprising name for a Confederate ship. For each vessel, the award
decided whether Britain failed in its duties as a neutral, based on factual analysis, in-
cluding when vessels took coal in British ports.
After the award was read publicly at the Hôtel de Ville in Geneva, Sir Alexander
Cockburn produced his separate opinion disagreeing on many matters, including the
sum of damages. According to Cockburn, the American propositions demonstrated a
most singular confusion of ideas, misrepresentations of facts, and ignorance of law
and history.
5 . C O N T I N U I N G T H E P I L G R I M A G E
5.1 Precedents and prototypes
The 1872 proceedings in Geneva met their objective of avoiding armed conflict be-
tween Britain and the United States. The two sides accepted the decision, even
though each hoped for a different result, with Britain seeking a more modest award,
and the United States expecting indirect damages for a war prolonged by British as-
sistance to the South’s navy.
During the century and a half since the award, the arbitration has taken its own
pilgrimage, leaving an example of orderly international dispute resolution. The award
made stops in university lecture halls, scholarly treatises, and lawyers’ briefcases, with
side visits to foreign offices and state departments. The arbitration paved the way for
Anglo-American cooperation on strategic interests in an alliance that endures to this
day, and confirmed substantive rules of international law related to naval neutrality
and state responsibility.
The Alabama Arbitration also gave guidance for key features of modern interna-
tional arbitration procedure building on compromises and among rival goals in fair
and peaceful dispute resolution. As presiding arbitrator, Count Sclopis recognized
the importance of such trade-offs when accepting a separate opinion from Sir
Alexander Cockburn. From one perspective, a separate opinion with dissenting views
might weaken the award by revealing flaws in reasoning. From another viewpoint,
threat of dissent can promote more rigorous collegial exchanges within the tribunal.
The Alabama Arbitration thus provides strong precedent for the type of ‘cost-benefit’
(or ‘benefit-benefit’) analysis now enshrined in ‘soft law’ norms representing a lex
mercatoria of cross-border arbitral procedure, with each trade-off implicating diverse
legal and cultural norms.29
29 Such ‘soft law’ norms often derive from cross-border institutions like the International Bar Association,
implicating document production, sequencing of submissions, allocation of legal costs, and cross-
examination. See William W Park, ‘The Procedural Soft Law of International Arbitration’ in L Mistelis
and J Lew (eds), Pervasive Problems in International Arbitration (L. Mistelis & J. Lew eds.2006) 141. On
compromise among national norms, see also William W Park, Procedural Trade-Offs in Arbitration, forth-
coming 2021.
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5.2 Contours of arbitral authority
Several attributes of international arbitration trace their lineage to the Alabama
Claims case: party-appointed arbitrators, collegial deliberations, reasoned awards, dis-
senting opinions, and the opportunity for arbitrators to address limits on their own
jurisdiction. Among these, few have proven more complex than the latter, implicating
principles related to arbitrators’ pronouncements on the contours of their own
authority.
In most legal systems, the right of arbitrators to rule on their powers has been
established, even if such pronouncements prove tentative, subject to later judicial re-
view. For commercial arbitration, arbitrators’ jurisdictional decisions implicate a sub-
tle interaction between the roles of judges and arbitrators.
In respect of jurisdictional determinations, Johnny Veeder offered a vivid account
of how the arbitrators in the Alabama Arbitration approached a challenge to their au-
thority that might well have derailed the proceedings.30 An inquiry into that jurisdic-
tional challenge provides a springboard to consider bridges from past to present in
relation to a predicament common to arbitrations across a broad spectrum today,
whether in disputes concerning commercial transactions or investor–state expropria-
tion claims.
After the tribunal in the Alabama Arbitration began hearings, the United States
sought ‘indirect’ damages from Confederate cruisers alleged to having prolonged the
Civil War for two years after the Battle of Gettysburg.
Veeder recounts how the two party-appointed arbitrators, Charles Francis Adams
and Sir Alexander Cockburn, worked behind the scenes in collegial cooperation to
achieve consensus on a declaration that would overcome an impasse. Adopted on 19
June 1872, four days after hearings had begun, the consensus constituted neither an
order nor an award, but a unanimous declaration announced by the tribunal presi-
dent that claims for indirect damages did not constitute good foundation for an
award of compensation between the two nations, and should be excluded from con-
sideration of the tribunal.31
The arbitral tribunal has made a simple jurisdictional declaration, rather than a
formal ruling, should not hide the arbitrators’ boldness in restricting their own au-
thority. Setting limits to its power, finding competence to fix direct but not indirect
damages, the arbitral tribunal created precedent for arbitrators’ addressing the scope
of their jurisdiction.
Thoughtful observers will rightly note the need for caution in suggesting bridges
from 19th century inter-state proceedings, on the one hand, to modern commercial
and investment arbitrations, on the other. Today, arbitration implicates frameworks
for judicial and institutional review not applicable to the Geneva proceedings in the
Alabama Arbitration. Nevertheless, appreciation of where we came from can augment
30 Veeder (n 7) 132–47. Veeder reacts to comments on the practice of party appointment of arbitrators by
scholars including Jan Paulsson, ‘Moral Hazard in International Dispute Resolution’ (2010) 25 ICSID
Rev 339; Albert Jan van den Berg, ‘Dissenting Opinions by Party-Appointed Arbitrators in Investment
Arbitration’ in Mahnoush Arsanjani and others (eds), Looking to the Future: Essays in International Law in
Honor of W. Michael Reisman (2011) 821.
31 Hackett (n 19) 393, Appendix III.
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understanding of how arbitration works at present.32 Even if one cannot build today
on an assumption of yesterday’s permanence, we must build on something, with yes-
terday providing a key analytic building block.
The Alabama Claims tribunal did not deal with the very existence of an agreement
to arbitrate, clearly contained in the Treaty of Washington. Rather, the arbitral tribu-
nal addressed the scope of consent to arbitrate: whether or not the agreement
proved broad enough to cover claims for indirect damages. Similar wrangling about
the scope of an arbitration arises in modern commercial proceedings, albeit with the
significant wrinkle that resolution of today’s business disputes unfolds in the shadow
of potential judicial review by national courts pursuant to established legal
frameworks.33
Judicial review of arbitrators’ jurisdictional rulings often finds discussion under
the much-vexed term Kompetenz-Kompetenz,34 rendered ‘jurisdiction to decide
jurisdiction’ in an English formulation. The details of arbitrators’ ‘jurisdiction to
decide jurisdiction’ vary from one legal system to another. In its simplest applica-
tion, the principle means only that arbitrators can continue their work even if a
party challenges arbitral jurisdiction, exactly what happened when the arbitral tri-
bunal in the Alabama Arbitration considered depredations by the British-built
vessels that had served the Southern Confederacy. Some observers see distinc-
tions between ‘positive’ Kompetenz-Kompetenz, allowing arbitrators to resolve ju-
risdictional challenges without reference to national courts, and ‘negative’
Kompetenz-Kompetenz, telling judges when to refrain from hearing jurisdictional
challenges in arbitration. Arbitration does not necessarily stop just because one
side challenges arbitral authority. Neither do related judicial actions necessarily
cease, although they may be deferred.35
For commercial contracts, allowing arbitrators to address their own jurisdiction may
trigger judicial review implicating choice-of-law clauses and designation of arbitral seats
against the backdrop of multiple treaty networks. In some instances, different national
courts apply similar choice-of-law analyses that bring divergent conclusions about what
32 One recalls the admonition of French historian Jules Michelet, that those who would confine their
thoughts to present time will not understand present reality: Celui qui veut s’en tenir au présent, à l’actuel,
ne comprendra pas l’actuel. Introduction to Jules Michelet, Le Peuple (1846) xvii. In his study of the
French laboring class, Michelet recounts his own origins working at his father’s printing press, which led
to a deeper understanding of their present condition on the eve of the 1848 Revolution.
33 For an example of courts addressing the contours of arbitral jurisdiction, see Lesotho Highlands v
Impregilo [2005] UKHL 43, upholding the arbitrators’ award in a basket of European currencies, in a con-
tract dispute initially implicating Lesotho Maloti, significantly depreciated since payment had been due.
See William W Park, ‘The Nature of Arbitral Authority: A Comment on Lesotho Highlands’ (2005) 21
Arb Int’l 483.
34 The phrase derives from a court decision in Germany where an arbitral tribunal had ruled on its own ju-
risdiction pursuant to a clause agreed by both parties, implicitly dispensing with subsequent judicial re-
view, with the Bundesgerichtshof finding that parties to a commercial contract could submit the question
of arbitral authority to binding arbitration. BGH, 5 Mai 1977, III ZR 177/74, reported in 68 BGHZ 356,
358. See Peter Schlosser, Das Recht der Internationalen Privaten Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit (1989) s556.
35 Emmanuel Gaillard, ‘L’effet Negative de la Competence-compétence’ in J Haldy, J-M Rapp and P Ferrari
(eds), Études de Procédures et D’arbitrage en L’honneur de Jean-François Poudret (1999) 385. Cf William W
Park, ‘The Arbitrator’s Jurisdiction to Determine Jurisdiction’ in Arbitration of International Business
Disputes 231 (2nd edn, 2012). For relevant case law on what in the United States has come to be called
‘the arbitrability question’, see First Options v Kaplan, 514 US 938 (1995).
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claims arbitrators may hear.36 In certain countries, courts apply local contract law prin-
ciples to determine the extent of an arbitration clause.37
Notwithstanding divergences in national law, the import of the jurisdictional prec-
edent in the Alabama Arbitration can hardly be overstated. Without an option for an
arbitral tribunal to continue work despite jurisdictional challenges, a party wishing to
sabotage an arbitration could stop proceedings simply by questioning the arbitrators’
authority.
Modern arbitration remains workable in part because an 1872 arbitral tribunal in
Geneva set a precedent for giving arbitrators a first word on their jurisdiction, even if
courts get the last. The journey towards workable principles for determining arbitral
jurisdiction, set in motion by the Alabama Arbitration, takes special significance as in-
ternational arbitration has moved beyond government-to-government disputes, in-
creasingly pressed into service for resolution of high-value private commercial and
investment disputes.
The relationship between public and private arbitration brings to mind the Greek
sea god Proteus, who could alter his outward shape at will, notwithstanding that his
substance remained the same. Just as Proteus could reinvent himself, so arbitration
can alter its form to adapt to new circumstances. When examined through the lens
of the legal culture for each age and context, arbitration gives rise to procedural ele-
ments both transient and permanent.38
In some instances, arbitrators decide public law conflicts, like those arising from
British support for the Southern Confederacy through supply and service of commerce
raiders during the American Civil War. In other cases, arbitrators address contract
breaches, oil price revision, or royalty rates in cross-border licences. Arbitrators might
also determine hybrid public/private disputes such as expropriation claims arising from
international investment, or allocation of fiscal jurisdiction under income tax treaties.39
36 See, for example, Dallah Real Estate & Tourism Holding Co v Ministry of Religious Affairs, Gov of Pakistan
[2011] 1 AC 763. The UK Supreme Court refused to enforce an ICC award made in Paris in favor of a
Saudi company, reasoning that under French law the Pakistani government was not bound by an agree-
ment signed by a trust established by the government. A year later, a French court came to the opposite
conclusion, rejecting an application to vacate the award in favor of the Saudi creditor, reasoning that con-
tract negotiations by Pakistani government officials made the government the true contracting party.
Gouvernement du Pakistan c Société Dallah, Cour d’appel de Paris, 1ère Chambre, 17 février 2011.
37 GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS v Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, 140 S Ct 1637 (2020). When a
non-signatory attempted to compel arbitration, the US Supreme Court instructed lower courts to employ
choice-of-law analysis looking at doctrines like ‘estoppel’ and third-party beneficiary. A separate opinion
by Justice Sotomayor cautioned that those seeking to enforce arbitration agreements ‘may not rely on do-
mestic non-signatory doctrines that fail to reflect consent to arbitrate’. ibid 1648. Compare Henry Schein
Inc v Archer & White Sales Inc, 139 S Ct 524 (2019), where the court had to determine whether a contract
‘delegated’ to the arbitrator authority to decide if the case implicated injunctive relief, such relief arguably
precluded by the contract.
38 By way of analogy, public and private international law tackle different questions. Yet each remains law.
Private international law (sometimes ‘conflicts of law’) addresses choice of law, jurisdiction, and enforce-
ment of judgments. Public international law looks at problems like the standards for naval neutrality.
Likewise, chess and baseball remain games even though played quite differently. Other comparisons
come to mind. The label ‘tax’ applies to real estate levies as well as to fiscal withholding on dividends paid
to foreign corporations, notwithstanding disparity in the object of each assessment.
39 See William W Park, ‘Tax and Arbitration’ (2020) 36 Arb Int’l 157; William W Park and David R
Tillinghast, Income Tax Treaty Arbitration (2004).
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In each context, arbitration can promote global well-being, whether in state-to-
state disputes by providing an alternative to war, or for commercial and investment
disputes by enhancing confidence in wealth-creating economic cooperation through
providing adjudicatory fora more neutral than the hometown justice of the other
side’s courts. Although public and commercial arbitration remain distinct, each sits
on the same foundation: consent to binding adjudication by individuals chosen di-
rectly or indirectly by the parties.
In state-to-state arbitration, an agreement waives resort to armed conflict. In pri-
vate arbitration, consent to arbitration renounces recourse to national judicial power,
even if courts might annul a decision tainted by procedural irregularity or seize assets
to satisfy an award. In each context, the disputants seek to vindicate legitimate
expectations through fair determination of facts and law pursuant to a model set in
the Alabama Arbitration.40
5.3 The larger hope
The Alabama Claims process spurred hopes beyond avoidance of war between
Britain and the United States. The larger hope rested on a prospect that arbitration
might deliver dividends of peace and justice on a broader scale, serving as a vehicle
to transform implements of war into tools for productivity.
Humankind stubbornly resists Isaiah’s prophecies that swords will be beaten into
plowshares, at least on a scale that makes war obsolete. The century following the
Alabama Arbitration saw two World Wars with armed conflict of almost unimagin-
able proportion.
Hopes deferred, however, need not mean hopes defeated. Nor does lack of seam-
less success detract from the value of incremental achievement. Even against a back-
drop of continuing cross-border conflict, the arbitral process plays a fundamental
role in peaceful resolution of commercial and investment disputes with a cross-
border component. For international transactions, arbitration increases the partici-
pants’ confidence that legitimate expectations will be met, through dispute adjudica-
tion both principled and reliable, even if not perfect or universal. In turn, enhanced
confidence in transactional predictability promotes economic teamwork that can
help take profit out of warfare.41
Setting an example of principled international dispute resolution, the Alabama
Arbitration provided building blocks for welfare-enhancing collaboration among peo-
ples from diverse backgrounds, serving as a harbinger to many milestones in
40 Jan Paulsson suggests the ‘idea of arbitration’ to include binding resolution of disputes accepted with se-
renity by those who bear its consequences because of their special trust in chosen decision-makers.’ Jan
Paulsson, The Idea of Arbitration (2013) 1. In a section of his book titled ‘Untidy Realities’, Paulsson
notes that some adjudicatory processes get labelled ‘arbitration’ although their nature belies that descrip-
tion, as for example, Koranic negotiation by friends of disputants, while others take a different label but
with a core that remains arbitration, such as ‘recommendations’ by mediators so respected in the relevant
community that their advice takes on a de facto bindingness. ibid 18–19.
41 In this connection, one recalls the observation of 19th century French political thinker Claude Frédéric
Bastiat, that if goods do not cross borders, armies will: Si les marchandises ne traversent pas les frontières, les
soldats le feront.
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international law.42 Notwithstanding the scarcity of Messianic concord for interna-
tional relations, fruits did grow from the arbitration endorsed by Queen Victoria for
Britain and President Ulysses S Grant for the United States. With twists and turns,
the pilgrimage to peace continues through a model of dispute resolution set by the
Alabama Arbitration. The next steps of the journey remain a story for another day.
42 Milestones for international teamwork include the 1899 and 1907 Hague Peace Conferences; establish-
ment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 1899 and the Permanent Court of International Justice in
1920; the Geneva Arbitration Treaties of 1923 and 1928; creation of the International Court of Justice in
1945; the New York Arbitration Convention of 1958, along with the Washington and Panama
Arbitration Conventions of 1965 and 1975, respectively. For an exploration of the role of the Alabama
Arbitration to establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice, see Martti Koskenniemi,
‘The Ideology of International Adjudication and the 1907 Hague Conference’ in Yves Daudet (ed)
Topicality of the 1907 Hague Conference 127 (Hague Academy of International Law, Leiden, Martinus
Nijhoff 2007).
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APPENDIX: THE CSS ALABAMA AT GALVESTON
The replica of the Alabama, housed in a bottle once home to a half gallon of Johnnie Walker
Scotch Whiskey, sits amid a diorama showing the lighthouse at Galveston, Texas, where in January
1863 the Alabama engaged Union forces and sank the USS Hatteras.
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